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Law, Logic and Communication
By Walter Probert
FORM VS. INFORM
IF I HAD to choose, I think I would rather have a legal discourse
which was informative than one which was merely "logical" By "logical"
I mean what usually passes for "good reasoning" in legal circles, a matter
of verbal consistency. If you are not familiar with general semantics, or
at least the various notions that form its bases, then you may be inclined
to think that verbal consistency is the epitome of any discourse. I must
agree that verbal consistency is important, but my quarrel comes with
those who would stop there. There are too many legal professionals -
judges, lawyers, teachers,
etc. - who stop right
THE AUTHOR (B.S., 1949, J.D., 1951, Univer- there.
sity of Oregon; J.S.D., 1957, Yale University) Actually, this business
is an associate professor of law at Western Re-
serve University. of being verbally consis-
tent is no easy task. In
the effort, we legal profes-
sionals have built up a particularly complex scheme of "logic" or verbal
consistency over the years. To begin with, we have syllogistic reasoning
built deeply into our language structure. You need know nothing about
the syllogism to use its form, for you can barely speak without colloquial-
izing a syllogism. Classification is the form involved. Any time you
classify you may be said to start or end or jump right in the middle of
a syllogism. Of course, legal discourse is replete with classifications.
Legal rules are classifications. A decision to treat corporations like
people -is a classification. "Rights" and "duties" are classifications.
Understand, legal discourse has no corner on this technique. Everyday
language as well as legal discourse is actually structured, patterned, ha-
bitually used as a vehicle of classification. This is our basic logic.'
A somewhat related form, very much represented in legal discourse
is the analogy. The doctrine of stare decisis of course depends upon the
analogy for survival. Calling upon the authority of some previous de-
cision is in the main pointing to factors in that case which are "like"
1The form of the syllogism is: All As are B's, all B's are C's, therefore all A's are
C's. Inherent in the form is a system of logic of classification. Lacking the form,
but equally "syllogistic" in derivation are such statements as: Republicans favor the
high tariff, Americans are capitalists, dogs have four legs, tenants owe a duty to use
due care toward their invitees, every contract must have consideration, etc.
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factors in some case at hand. The process becomes so easy that we tend
to identify the one case with the other and go zooming off into the purely
formal stratospheres of legal classifications and abstractions. But note
that the process of analogizing is at heart the process of classification,
so that the analogy tends to rise and fall with the logic of classification,
falling where the classifying technique blocks imaginative inquiry and
research. Comparing two cases, finding something "similar" about them,
is classifying them, grouping them together. Differentiating two cases,
finding something different about them is the setting up of two classes.
A seemingly much more involved form of legal logic is that of "syn-
tax." Syntax refers to a system of symbolic relationships. Should you
take the formula a + -b - 6, then supply a value of "2" to the letter
"a;' you would conclude that the appropriate value for "b" was "4." You
would thus have engaged in pure syntactic reasoning. You would have
relied on symbolic consistency. The basic relationships involved were
repsented by the plus and equal signs. These signs represent opera-
tions you have learned to perform in your head, so to speak. The sym-
bolic manipulation can be translated into bodily movements in dealing
with things "outside" the body, but these latter operations are not the
"in the head" manipulations involved in the simple algebraic formula.
Picking out six apples to feed six guests is one thing. The syntactic
logic preceding the picking another. We have learned to correlate the
two, but we recognize fairly readily the separateness of these operations.
Indeed we learn very early in elementary school that we must correlate
our arithmetic (syntactic) formulae with our world environment if we
are to make any sense out of them. Thus we are told not to multiply
"feet" by "yards" else we will get an "answer" which will not fit the
non-symbolic terrain - the map will not accurately represent the
territory.
A road map is a kind of syntax. You know that a road map of the,
state of New York is not actually the state of New York. It is sym-
bolic; it represents. As in the arithmetic maps, the road map .involves a
structure. In this case, the road map looks so much "like" the terrain
represented that we quite 'asily correlate" the structure or syntax of the
map with that of the terrain; but just as we get into trouble by multi-
plying feet times yards, so we get into trouble when the structure of the
map is not corrilated with that of the terrain. If a superhighway is
said to run north and south when personal reconnaissance proves it to
run east and west, somebody will surely go astray.
Our use of everyday language involves the making of and reacting to
verbal roadmaps. You cannot see these maps in the same way you see
[March
THE LANGUAGE OF LAW
roadmaps, so the existence of a structure may be harder to detect. Yet
recall that you may be given verbal instructions on how to go from one
location to another. Your travel between these two spots requires a
correlation between the verbal structures involved and the non-verbal
road structures.
Even more difficult to detect are the esoteric structures of legal dis-
course. Yet the breakdown of that discourse into areas of law - into
property, contracts, torts, criminal law, etc. - is the building of a pat-
tern. If nothing else, this structure helps you to get around a law
library, just as a roadmap helps you to use your automobile. I shall
shortly question how well this kind of structure, alone, helps you to get
around in your total world of experience, legal and non-legal, "internal"
and "external."
Now come "down" a bit in the strata of legal abstractions to a very
interesting and highly significant legal syntax or doctrine, the doctrine
of the "tort" of negligence. As with the earlier arithmetic formula, as
with the roadmap, we find here key symbols and definite relationships
between them. Their use leads to definite "in the head" operations and
ultimately to such operations as entry of judgment, seizure of goods, etc.
The formula is easy to state. In order to find a person "guilty" of the
tort of negligence, you must find that he owed a duty to a prospective
plaintiff to use due care, that he breached this duty and that in so doing
he proximately caused damage to that plaintiff to his injury. Duty +
breach + proximate cause + damage = injury = liability. Should one
of the four "elements" on the left hand side of the equation be missing,
then there is no liability. On the other hand, the duty road leads into
the breach road, the -breach road leads into the proximate cause road,
etc., into liability and subsequent authoritarian operations. There is no
doubt that this syntax serves as a map insofar as it is correlated with the
authoritarian activities symbolized by the judge's gavel What is not
so clear is whether this syntax, this map, accurately represents or allows
to you movement around your world of total experience, "internal" and
"external." More of this anon.
The complexity of legal syntax is further revealed by its service as
a device of classification and analogy. Not only does it provide a pat-
tern for analysis and operation as already suggested, it provides a means
of high level comparison and differentiation. One may, if he wishes,
decide a case being argued on a theory of contract without once involv-
ing himself very deeply or at all in a specific prior judicial decision.
The letter dropped in a mailbox is an acceptance at that moment, and
who cares the name or the nature of the case (s) giving rise to that
generality, that high level abstraction. If you do use this generality and
19581
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do so in the name of stare decisis, you are reasoning 'by analogy. You
have chosen to compare one act out of a context of a current situation
with what seems to be a "similar" act in a similar yet different context
in an historical situation. Should you refer to the cases giving rise to this
generality, you would also 'be analogizing although you might then detect
differences which have been left out in the current abstractions of con-
tract syntax. Please do remember that differences have been left out.
We do leave out differences when we abstract.
Of course, legal syntax, that is legal doctrines and legal rules, in-
volves the process of classifying and tends to rise or fall with that kind
of logic, falling when used in a purely formal or arithmetic way. Legal
syntax also involves the making of definitions. Again we may turn to
elementary mathematics for an analogy. In the syntax of Euclid's plane
geometry, a point is dimensionless, by definition, and two parallel lines
never meet, by definition. There are those who would argue, quite per-
suasively, that you can find a "point" and "parallel lines" nowhere but
in these definitions. Fortunately this act of "pure reasoning" on the
part of Euclid does not prevent use of the definitions to solve problems
in the work-a-day world. Measurable differences between line. and line,
and between point1 and 'point. may be ignored; the possible ultimate
convergence of two "lines" drawn on paper may 'be ignored. These
differences may 'be ignored, but should be ignored only for some pur-
poses. Unfortunately for legal discourse, an habitual process of reasoning
by definition cannot be so readily explained away. To find out whether
ignored differences in pertinent situations called cases ought to be ig-
nored, we must first recognize that presently we do engage in this kind
of decision 'by definition. Then we must see what we can do about it.
To follow up the previous examples, we may define a duty to use
due care as an expectancy, backed up by legal authority, that one person
.will take reasonable precautions in his conduct and/or in his living habits
to protect others from harm. Aside from the presence of many "weaser'
words in this formula, such as "reasonable" and "harm," which themselves
must 'be defined, such a definition when accepted stands a chance of
becoming a verbal satellite, related in definite ways to the mother syntax,
yet following its own defined path. As with any words, the definition
stands a chance of 'being reacted to not as if it were composed of words,
but as if it were flesh and gavel. Examples of this kind of conditioned
response are scattered throughout the following text.2 In addition, the
Such a definitional emphasis blocks consideration of underlying relationships. The
ostensible language of "negligence" cases is notorious in this respect. Reaction to a
life insurance company-beneficiary conflict, later elaborated, as if it were a horse-
trading situation, a "general" contract situation, is another example.
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observer may, in reacting automatically to definitions, fail to see under-
lying variances in those definitions. The fact that one judge uses "duty"
in explanation of his decision does not mean he is defining that word
the same way as another judge. A seeming agreement to use the same
map may actually involve an agreement to use different maps. The dis-
agreement between judges Cardozo and Andrews in the famous Palsgraf
Case stems at least partly from differing definitions of the word "duty."3
One cannot get down to the more vital disagreements of those judges in
that case until he satisfies himself on that point.4
There, quite briefly for all the complexity involved, are the forms of
logic which tend to appear in our legal discourse. Admitting that differ-
ent stages of legal inquiry and problem solving do call into play differ-
ing psychological and physiological processes, still the language used by
appellate courts runs through almost all of legal discourse. The forms
mentioned find their way into the smallest cubbyholes of the legal build-
ing.
Running through the preceding description is this thread of warn-
ing: Verbal consistency, whether in classifying, analogizing, applying
rules or defining, may be achieved with little or no reference to the
world of "fact." Maps may be made without reference to the terrain
supposedly represented. General semantic theory thus raises serious
questions for legal professionals: Do your verbal maps fairly and ac-
curately represent the human terrain? May you be stepping on "rights"
and lives not accurately located on your verbal maps?
The warning may be stated in another way. We need to pay atten-
tion not only to the form of our statements but also to the information
embraced in the form. We need to use discourse as a means of com-
municating. There should be no argument about that. Yet we ignore
the communication factor, not purposely but through a lack of awareness
of the role of language in the individual's human process of reacting to
the totality of experience in the world about him. As a result we assume
*Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co. 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928). Two guards
on one of defendant's trains helped a late passenger abroad a moving train. As a
result a package of "fireworks" was dislodged from the passenger's grasp. The ensu-
ing explosion knocked over a scale onto the plaintiff some distance away.
Judge Cardozo writing for the majority found as a matter of law that the duty-
breach of duty requirements of negligence syntax had not been satisfied because no
harm to the plaintiff was "foreseeable" under the circumstances.
Judge Andrews writing for the minority found defendant breached its duty in
taking an unreasonable risk of harm to the passenger. The minority declared satis-
faction with leaving the final decision to the jury under the concept of proximate
cause.
'Furthermore, failing to see this definitional flexibility, one then stands a very good
chance of having the conditioned response to whatever definition seems to him to
be the most "logical" in itself. Such a response is nothing but "word magic."
19581]
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we are communicating with each other (or else we care little about that
factor so long as we get the results we want). However, an intelligent
p-attern of legal activity can hardly be built without some sort of sub-
stance, a substance of community experience.
Take what is thought to be the heart of legal reasoning, the doctrine
of stare decisis. Here is involved a noble effort, an effort to 'bring past
experiences to -bear upon new situations. But what is the channel of
communicating that past experience of various individuals to the per-
sonal experience of a particular judge? The channel consists of either
very high level abstractions in the form of legal syntax previously re-
ferred to or the sources of this syntax, judicial reports. Now the judicial
reports are considerably more informative than the legal syntax, they
tell us considerably more of the history of several judges' reactions to
one litigational situation. Yet how very little these reports actually do
tell us about that reaction or that situation. Again, we are faced with
abstraction, at a relatively "high" level.
This is no call for abolishing judicial reports. Don Quixote would
not be so brash. However, you should see that this particular channel of
communication, while not completely blocked, is considerably cluttered
and that there may 'be other valuable channels of communication, not
only for the transmission of historical experience but contemporary ex-
perience as well. Such is the call too of sociological jurisprudence.
Given a wide awareness of this communication problem, the reforms
will come.
Likewise there is here no call for changing legal discourse or its
forms. That call must await many years of education, but we can in-
vestigate that discourse to see what some of the obstacles may be as they
are spotlighted by a general semantic kind of analysis. Awareness of the
obstacles can not help -but bring a greater effort to remove them. I can
predict that result with assurance for I know I am dealing with practical
people.
LEGAL CONCEPTS AND THE PROCESS OF ABSTRACTION
Having suggested in a very general way the need for correlating our
verbal maps with our non-verbal experiences, let me now discuss some
of the reasons why we may not be doing all we can in this direction.
As it is with every man and his every day language, so it is with the
lawyer. The main obstacles to communication come from a prevailing
unfamiliarity with the process of abstraction. We bring all our lan-
guage habits to bear upon our seemingly technical language. While we
mnay be attempting to 'build a kind of a mathematical language, we suf-
fer from the disadvantage of having to use not mathematical symbols
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but words very often in common use. If not that, then we use technical
words in non-technical ways, in the customary ways of our everyday
discourse. These obstructing habits may be lumped together for con-
venience under the label of "identification." We identify one verbal
level of abstraction with another, the non-verbal level with the verbal
and one non-verbal configuration with another. Thus, to break the
grouping down, we: (1) ignore or forget the changing patterns of
human response to seemingly static words (shifting meanings v. static
classification); (2) "thingify" words (objectification, classified reactions);
(3) fail to see the widespread ambiguity in seemingly one-meaning
words (one-word-one-meaning); (4) suffer from hardening of the cate-
gories (confusing verbal levels of abstraction, rigidity of classifications);
(5) forget the varied relationships which are not yet embodied in our
doctrine (two-valued thinking, elementalism, classification fascination);
(6) etc.
Shifting Meanings
What lawyer has not taken his turn at "pouring new wine into old
bottles"? We all know full well that the old rationalizations are often
used in new ways to meet changing conditions in the community. What
we do not so readily realize is that this process goes on continuously.
Every use of a word involves actually a redefinition of that word. This
must be so if it is true that our world-environment is in perpetual dy-
namic process. The "chair" of 10:00 A. M. is simply not the "chair"
of 10:01 A. M. For one thing, the observer cannot possibly retain the
identical perspective from one moment to the next.
Think of this in another way. We all have observed the use of
fictions in legal discourse. You are aware that a corporation; for in.
stance, is not really a person. That is just a convenient way to think of
the corporate situation in order to solve certain conflicts that arise from
day to day. Yet, in a sense, every time a word is used it is used in a
fictional way. Without thinking about it, you may identify a corporation
with a "person." Similarly you identify this momenes reaction to the
word "chair" with your reaction a moment ago to that word. But con-
sider the difference in context, consider the changes that have taken
place in your entire nervous system, etc. The "you" of this moment is
not the "you" of a moment ago. Your reactions cannot be identical in
the two instances. In more familiar language, the meanings of words
change constantly. Unfortunately, our classifying tendencies tend to
rigidify our reactions. We are not as amenable to change as we might
be.
Now you may conveniently ignore some of these changes and con-
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tinue to operate in your environment, except that this kind of unaware-
ness acts as a blanket in all of communication, stifling efforts to see
under the static word. Perhaps you still need a reminder that "due
process n.w" is something altogether different from "due process 1900"
or "due process . That is, you need not respond to "due process"
always in the same way - you need not have a purely conditioned
response. In tort law, "unavoidable accident" has been a convenient ex-
pression to attach to "non-liability" situations. While the word-expres-
sion has remained constant, the kind of situation referred to has not.
"Unavoidable accident " may have been applied only to situations
where a defendant was involuntarily involved; only then was he not
liable. "Unavoidable accident 1900's" surely applied to a larger group
of situations including those in which defendant acted voluntarily but
"reasonably"; the courts in the 1900's were not so strict with defendants.
The word "fault" shows a similar amorphous quality, although we get
some impressions from some portions of legal discourse that not everyone
is aware of its changing content. Actually, a similar analysis can be
applied to any key term of legal discourse with interesting results.
The failure to take such an attitude toward our key legal concepts
blocks communication in at least two ways. A lawyer and a judge in a
court room may be conversing but not reaching each other, there may
be a -by-pass of information. They may not be aware that possibly they
are reacting differently to the same word. "Consideration" is a grand
old concept in contract law, -but there is absolutely no guarantee that two
people are talking about the same ideas simply because they use that
word. What is perhaps worse is the blocking of intra-personal com-
munication. A lawyer seeking a solution to his problem, or a judge seek-
ing a "proper" decision may fail to realize the creative role he can play.
He fails to see the alternative ways he may respond; he takes the chance
of playing the robot rather than the highly imaginative human role
available.
Objectification
Despite their undoubted sincerity, in the main, legal professionals
have not been able to avoid what may now be called a primitive tendency
to embody certain words in flesh and bones or wrap them in some kind
of tangibility and treat them as touchable, reacting parts of their environ-
ment. This thingifying, objectifying, conceptualizing; this failure to ap-
preciate the chiefly symbolic nature of words provides one of the chief
examples of the conditioned or automatic response of the language-animal.
Evidence that we are not so far removed from primitive man's re-
actions of the same sort may easily be uncovered. Have you ever seen
[March
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a corporation? What does it look like? It is only -because of the
habitual objectification of this word-idea that judges sometimes find it
necessary to "pierce the corporate veil," and then of all things, almost
apologize for doing so. Such piercing is simply a treatment of the
corporate situation as it is perceived behind one of the iron curtains in
our language. The legal world's sometimes treatment of this situation is
remindful of the view that most educated people take toward "electrons. '5
They think of little round balls floating around in each table top, al-
though no physicist can establish the existence of such little balls. In-
deed, a possible view of the electron is that it "looks like" a tetrahedron.
But you need not imagine floating tetrahedrons. This is only a figure
of speech, a way of drawing a map of physical events. Do you try to
drive your car over a road map to get where you are going? It is con-
ceivable that someday we will come to the conclusion that the "person"
notion of the corporation is not the best map we can draw.6
Some people have already come to that conclusion about the word
"title" in sales law. Have you ever seen a "tide"? Now I am not talk-
ing about the certificate you may carry around with you as "evidence of
your title" in an automobile. In sales law, "title passing" was once a
convenient shorthand for a legal implication of a commercial event.
Today the figure carries the potential of bringing a nonsensical reaction
in lawyers and decision-makers because of the tendency to analogize title
to a button, leading only to "title, title, who has the title." Blocked off
from observation are human interactions and the complexities of their
conflicts. Yet I predict with complete assurance that many intelligent
lawyers will never give in to the idea of reducing "title" to obscurity
in sales law.7 There is more than commercial conservativeness involved.
There is simply a -preoccupation with language symbols.
'We in the United States have not had our vision obstructed by this "person" idea
as have the continental jurists who have worried a great deal about the "real" organic
nature of the corporation, or the existence of a corporate soul. Citations to some of
the discussions are collected in Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. v. Pierson, 130 Misc. 110,
222 N.Y.S. 532 (1927). Justice Bijur there shows the kind of sophistication often
shown by many of our judges in recognizing the point of the text that the "person"
idea is no more than a figure of speech.
'Justice Bijur in Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. v. Pierson, 130 Misc. 110, 119, 222
N.Y.S. 532, 543 (1927). The opinion suggests "that a corporation is more nearly a
method than a thing... [it is] a name for a useful and usual collection of jural rela-
tions, each one of which must in every instance be ascertained, analyzed and assigned
to its appropriate place according to the circumstances of the particular case... (T)he
word 'corporation' has a variable, not a constant meaning." (emphasis supplied).
'Of course, there is now abroad an attempt to bring just that obscurity to the title
concept in the law of sales. See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, Art. 2 (Proposed
final draft 1950). Karl Llewellyn has been chiefly responsible for the crusade
against the "title" objectification.
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Consider the "reasonable" man. Law students have a terrible time
with that notion. I wonder about jurors. The attempt to visualize
that "man" -blocks consideration of information at hand. The effort
of visualizing that fine fellow actually hinders an observer from seeing
other possibly more valuable configurations. If you have ever stopped
to think about it, you realize how very difficult it is to give completely
of your attention to another person, whether in listening to his words
or seeing them written on the page, but effective communication re-
quires just that complete giving. Primitive reactions immediately
frustrate the effort.
The "inalienable rights" or just plain "rights" provide further ex-
amples. Nobody carries these "things" around in their pocket - but
a -person may act in a certain way toward another -because of some per-
sonal moral code or because of some fear of future prosecution or
litigation or because he has been trained to act that way. This is the
stuff of rights and duties, but you can not mount these activities or
"thoughts" on cement blocks. Again, the failure to understand this
point leads to purely emotive arguments and leads legal observers far
away from the possible avenues of maximum information.
One-Word-One-Meaning
What is th meaning of "possession," or what is "possession," or
what is a "tort"? You would not have to look far in legal literature
to find attempts to answer these questions. Perhaps there is no harm
in the attempts, but the real harm can come from thinking that humao
responses to a word should or can be fixed for once and for always
or from thinking that the kind of social situations which vil arise can
be predicted with certainty by reference to those situations which have
arisen in the past.
The one-meaning fallacy is a kind of a definition seeking. As has
been already suggested, definition seeking may be a kind of a verbal
chess game, where purely syntactic rules are followed and the verbal
definition maps come to bear little resemblance to the social terrain.
Furthermore, the observer who believes words can have 'but one mean-
ing fails to be alert to the "by-passing" situation, the situation where
the sender is reacting to his own words in one way and the receiver
reacts to those words in an entirely different way. Perhaps you are
more familiar with the idea of ambiguity. One kind of ambiguity
has already been discussed, the kind that comes from the relativity of
each person's experience, from the uniqueness of each human being
and his responses. There is another kind which Korzybski chose to
call "multiordinality." Involved here is the potential of a word to refer
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to different levels in the process of abstraction without any sign except
context to indicate what level is involved. Further, not even context
gives the clue on many occasions. A non-legal example is the word
"blue." When the word appears, it has the potential of referring to
Smith, and his impression of the sky, or it may instead refer to the
physicists technical expression of wave-length in description of the ex-
ternal events which give rise to the impression in Smith1 of blueness.
One of the -best legal examples is the word "fact." We tend to
think dogmatically about this word and not realize the wide range of
possible references involved. We speak of the "objective facts," the
electrons of the judicial process, which only an omniscient, non-human
observer could know but which we purport to find via the trial tech-
niques. What of an individual witness who reports the "facts"? He
is actually giving his recollection of the sense impressions he received
from the on-going events around him, colored by his particular person-
ality, attentiveness, physical condition, etc. No need to belabor what
Jerome Frank among others so well emphasized, the untrustworthy
nature of much of our evidence.8 Yet here, for better or for worse,
is where our facts come from, not from the omniscient observer. The
"facts" finally "found" by a jury are not the objective facts any more
than my impression of a table on the sensory level is that table on
the sub-microscopic level. They are statements coming out of the inter-
meshings of twelve experience-machines. Then, of course, there are
the "facts" reviewed on appeal and the "facts" appearing in the judicial
report and the "facts" presented in a student's brief of the case or the
lawyer's description of a precedent. Can you give the definition of
"fact"?
Incidentally, another confusing reference of "fact" exists in the law
vs. fact dichotomy. Here is involved a nice way of referring to our
tradition of having a judge and a jury in the trial court. If the judge
keeps a case from the jury, we have a decision as a matter of law, but
if the jury is allowed to decide the matter, then we have a decision of
fact. In this reference, understanding of the word "fact" comes not
from looking for the "real meaning" of the word, but from analyzing
the relationship between the many trial judges and the many juries as
it has worked out in practice.9
Particularly blatant examples of the one-meaning problem arise
under statutory construction situations. Interpreting a statute is often
'His ideas on the subject nay be found collected in COURTS ON TRIAL (1949).
'Leon Green has helped work out this "meaning' for "facts" in his pioneer JUDGE
AND JURY (1930) and RATIONALE OF PROXIMATE CAUSE (1927). Far too little
has been done in this direction in other areas.
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said to be an attempt to find the "intent" of the legislature or an at-
tempt to find "the meaning" of the words used by the legislators. It
might be better to say, statutory interpretation is an attempt to react
to the words appearing in a statute in a manner reasonable under the
circumstances. There is perhaps no area of the legal process where
general semantic sophistication is more needed than in the drafting
and interpreting of legislative mandates in the form of statutes.
A comparatively recent Ohio case10 presents something of the kind
of problem involved here, or at least shows that one may seem auto-
matically to respond to words in a statute without considering the con-
text of the problem, proceeding then to clothe the response in a one-
meaning formula. This case involved the petition of a plaintiff em-
ployee who claimed that he -had been hurt on the job in such a fashion
as to allow him a remedy under the Ohio Workmen's Compensation
Act."x Defendant employer, a self-insurer, had led plaintiff to believe
that defendant had filed plaintiff's claim with the appropriate agency,
even going so far as to make weekly payments to plaintiff of the
kind he would receive if the appropriate machinery had been set into mo-
tion, as it had not. By the time plaintiff discovered the sham, he was
barred from pressing his statutory remedy by the two year statute of
limitations. Thus in the petition for relief, plaintiff set forth a cause
of action based on deceit on the part of the employer. It was at this
point that the response-to-words-in-a-statute problem arose.
Some of the words were to be found in a section of the Ohio Con-
stitution enabling the Ohio legislature to enact a workmen compensa-
tion scheme: "For the purpose of providing compensation to work-
men and their dependents, for . . . injuries or occupational diseases,
occasioned in the course of such workmen's employment. . .. Such
compensation shall be in lieu of all other rights to compensation . ..
for such injuries.'12  The Ohio court dismissed the plaintiff's suit.
Citations were given to show how the court had responded to those
words in previous situations to exclude any remedy except that explicitly
provided for by the Workmen's Compensation Act. "The intention,"
said the court, "was to relieve a complying employer from any liability
... for... injury ... suffered by an employee in the course of and
arising out of his employment."
Not only is the court guilty of the conditioned response to the
words in the constitution, but it is quite probably guilty of confusing
' Greenwalt v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 164 Ohio St. 1, 128 N.E. 2d 116
(1955).
" OHIO Rnv. CODE, Chap. 4123.
'OHIo CONST. Art. II 35.
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levels of abstraction in construing those words. Under the workmen's
compensation act, an employee may receive compensation for injuries
occurring "in the course of and arising out of" his employment. The
phraseology is usually -thought to refer to physical hurt on the job, the
kind of damage the plaintiff in this case had originally suffered. The
technical phrase ("in the course of and arising out of") 1 is a statement
about that class of cases. True enough, the deceit was an ("in the course
of and arising out of'), kind of harm, but these seemingly identical
word patterns occur at different levels of abstraction. The latter state-
ment includes any hurt or harm which is occasioned through the em-
ployment. The earlier statement embraces a smaller class of hurts
which are remediable under the act. A dissenting judge in the Ohio
case put it neatly enough by saying that this particular wrong, the
alleged trickery or deceit, was not within the comprehension of the act,
therefore the suit for fraud should not be barred by reference to a
section of the constitution which refers only to injuries within that
comprehension.
In short, the court either decided the case in automatic response to
the words of the constitutional section, as if they could have only one
meaning, or it did not inform the bar of the reasons for its decision.
In the first event words were used in such a fashion as to create an
obstacle between the judges and possible contact with the problem pre-
sented. In the alternative event, the court has blocked off our contact
with its total reaction. The process is disappointing at best.
By way of further example, take the word "reasonable" so often
found in the judicial maxims and so in much of legal literature. I
am quite sure that many people think they respond to this word as
if it should bring the same response from all observers, but no word
has such precision about it. This word may more properly be regarded
as being "emotive" in nature rather than quantitative or "logical"
Such a word calls for a feeling of approval or for side-taking, and
that is about all. One could obtain more wisdom about the legal
process in trying to discover the responses that have actually been given
to such a word than in trying to discover what it "really" means or
should mean. As with the word "fact," predictive content can be
given to such a word as "reasonable" -by seeing it, for example, in a
context of allocation of function between trial judge and jury.
The example of "reasonble" also serves to exemplify the problem
of communication blocking that pre-occupation with "one-meanings"
creates. Legal discourse is filled with other examples of this kind of
definition seeking which prevents legal professionals from doing in-
telligent research for relevant information in the clarification of legal
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problems. Different results may be reached by the same person de-
pending upon whether he is looking for a definition or for a "suitable"
solution. Thus the Ohio court which was faced with the situation
of a defendant throwing outrageous insults at a pregnant lady on a
public sidewalk would have had a different perspective in considering
whether or not to impose liability on the defendant if it had not been
preoccupied with its definitions of "assault," "battery" and other nom-
inate torts.13 If you understand that a word is redefined with every
use and if you appreciate that considerable definition-stretching does
also go on in legal discourse (providing needed flexibility, but also
blocking communication), then you would have little trouble in ac-
cepting a definition of "assault" to include that situation. Better yet
would be a recognition that the nominate torts do not cover all the sins
that man may some day invent - the recognition that there may be
no yet accepted label to cover the situation but that a rose without a
label does not lose its identity. A cause of action may be found in
uncharted seas. The vital point to see is that superimposing one-mean-
ing definitions from the past, and doing that alone, completely thwarts
the vision of the present and the future, prevents the observer from
observing, from reacting to new and relevant social conditions and con-
texts. To put it again, such discourse blocks communication.
A respected expert on the "nature" of tort pigeon holes has in my
opinion made much ado about almost nothing recently.' 4 His concern
arose over the possibility suggested by other commentators that a
plaintiff must have awareness of his confinement in order to recover
for a false imprisonment. He lists some situations that scream for
liability to prove his point that awareness of confinement should not
be required, such as the day old infant who is locked in a time vault.
I have the feeling that most courts will find as happy as possible a
solution to such a case. It is conceivable that some court might find
ihe way blocked if it worries about the definition of false imprison-
ment. Such a court might not react to the total situation, only a defini-
tion.
The problem of definition-seeking is by no means restricted to the
area of torts. Pre-occupation, for instance, with "what is an offer"
presents exactly the same problem. Some other "what is" examples
' Bartow v. Smith, 149 Ohio St. 301, 78 N.E.2d 735 (1948). The court, in a
close decision, held that there could be no recovery for psychological disturbance, as
extreme as this one was, unless it was associated with an "assault" or a "battery" or a
"false imprisonment," etc.
".Prosser, Fase mPrisonment: Consciousness of Confinement, 55 Col. L. Rev. 847
(1955); SMITH AND PROSSER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTs 64 (2nd ed.
1957).
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include: contingent remainder, control, trust, mens rea, corporation,
jurisdiction, an equity, holder-in-due-course, res gestae, a right, due
process, a cause of action. Asking what "these things" are simply points
in the wrong direction, merely to verbal map levels rather than non-
verbal levels of map-terrain correlation.
Confusion of Levels of Abstraction
The kind of human responses so far discussed all have in common
the failure to see diversity, the uniqueness of on-going facts, events and
processes, the actually unconscious identification of one part of ex-
perience with another. Another way of viewing this large scale re-
striction of the potential of the human nervous system is in terms of
the process of abstraction and the confusion of the so-called "levels" of
abstraction. If there seems to be some overlap with the previous sec-
tions, it is because the basic problem of identification is here too
involved.
1. Verbal Levels. Higher order abstractions may be evolved at
will, just as things and events may be classified in possibly an infinite
number of ways. So one may talk about Smith, Jones, Brown, Doe,
etc., as Republicans, humans, men, animals, etc. In talking about them
in this way, something is left out of the beginning characterization,
their separate identities are merged into some aspect(s) held "in
common." This ability to abstract at higher and higher levels is a mar-
velous tool, yet at the same time it provides a basis for misleading over-
simplifications. Whether an abstraction is marvelous or misleading de-
pends, recall, entirely upon the responses of human observers. Demo-
crat-minded Roe might find much of value in the company and advice of
Smith, Jones, Brown, Doe, etc., until the label Republican blocks any
further effort at information gathering on his part. He may easily stop
looking at their words and actions. Such a response is automatic.
Humans need not respond automatically.
The tendency of legal observers to react to legal abstractions in a
similar fashion is in some respects alarming. Not that all such ob-
servers do react this way at all times, but all observers dp react this way
on at least some occasions, and too many do so on too many occasions.
The earlier discussion of the tidte concept involves an abstraction in
point. Actually, "tide' as it is involved in a series of statements about
sales law refers to unique commercial events, a reference readily for-
gotten because these events are so easily tied together by the tide string.
The events are regarded as fungible. On the one hand you may have
a situation involving a seller who has decided not to carry through on
a promise to deliver certain goods because of the subsequently in-
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creased market value of his goods (involving tide1). On the other
hand you may have a buyer who fails to receive the desired goods from
a seller because of the derailment of the goods-carrying train (involv-
ing tide2 ). The difference in the situation-contexts is forgotten be-
cause of the abstraction, the similarity-pointing symbol, "tide." An
advocate or decision-maker or any observer can too readily miss seeing
that these situations are subject to different commercial handling, a
handling which is each equally predictable in its own sphere.15
Can you imagine walking along a sidewalk and suddenly tripping
over a hole in that sidewalk? Can you too imagine some person find-
ing his living conditions intolerable because of the noxious fumes of
nearby industrial factories? Of course some points of comparison be-
tween these two situations can be found, but they do not hit you first;
you first are struck by the differences. Yet these differences can be
subsumed in a pun on the word "nuisance." Described were nuisance1
and nuisance2 . If the words were spelled differently or did not sound
the same, then perhaps the two situations might not be confused. Yet
courts have talked about applying the doctrine of contributory neg-
ligence to one situation simply because it might be applied to the
other.'6  One might better dwell on the impact of liability insurance
upon each of these varying social situations rather than get caught up in
a mere coincidence. It may be that intelligent observation will indeed
lead to a similar handling of the two situations. But how can you tell
until you look?
Why treat an insurance contract1 like a building contract2? Con-
tract,, contract 2, contract, etc., is a convenient way to lump together
business dickerings, but sometimes that is the only convenience in the
label. The very way of life of some frustrated "beneficiaries" has been
changed because some court insisted that an applicant for insurance is
an "offeror" and a life insurance company -is an "offeree."'17 That being
so, the company must "accept" before there is a "contract" of insurance.
'Again credit for bringing this particular confusion to light must go to Karl Llew-
ellyn, see note 7 supra. Indeed the "Legal Realists," a group of pioneer skeptics
arising in a period of general skepticism in the Hoover-Roosevelt era, did much to
bring a "semantic" sophoistication to legal reasoning. The "group" incudes Llew-
ellyn, Green and Jerome Frank among many others. The possibility of extending
their "skepticism" to all of legal discourse is overlooked by those who have not un-
dergone a complete reorientation in their approach to that discourse, a la general
semantics. The assumption of such an orientation may be simply put: never assume
you are communicating.
" Even Justice Cardozo was guilty of the confusion, at least by way of dictum. Mc-
Farlane v. City of Niagara Falls, 247 N.Y. 340, 160 N.E. 391 (1928).
The cases and authorities are collected in PATTRsON, CAsis AND MATERIALs ON
INsURANcE, 642-655 (3d ed. 1955). See also Note, 4 Baylor L. Rev. 194 (1951).
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It necessarily follows, as a matter of syntax, that delay on the part of the
insurance company in acting upon an application - lulling the appli-
cant into what turns out to be a false sense of security - cannot be
regarded as an acceptance because in contract law silence is not accept-
ance. The contract . law of life insurance must be treated the way
that the contract cars law of automobile dealing is treated because of
that word "contract." Maybe the insurance company should not be
made to pay. But how can a word like "contract" or all of its associated
abstractions give the vital information leading to an intelligent de-
cision.' 8  In this connection it may be noted that a respected law teacher
sees no good reason why life insurance (insurance1 ) should be differ-
entiated for purposes of pedagogy from liability insurance (insurance2 ).39
These institutions do have features in common, but consider the differ-
ences in the kinds of events involved under these labels. Fortunately
there are other teachers who do not agree.
Finally, consider the legal professionals' particular pride and joy,
the legal rule, the generality abstracted from and about several or many
cases, cases unique in their complexities. Who has always remembered
that a rule cannot possibly tell much about even the reports of the
cases involved? Or how often is there a tendency to forget that a case
subsumed under one rule may quite readily be subsumed under another?
If you stop to consider that any two "objects" may be classified together
you may lose at least a little faith in the ultimacy of a rule-abstraction. 0
Add the fact that any two cases are distinguishable, and not in just
superficial ways, at least if you get down to the raw low level abstrac-
tion happenings - then where are you with your uninformative rules?
2. Two-valued Thinking. There is a great tendency to over-
simplify what happens in this world. We detect what seems to -be a
workable relationship and then quit looking. "Modern Science," in-
volving men like you and me reacting to their environment, seems to
have the fundamental assumption, now, that there may yet be other
undiscovered relationships, other than now known to us, the discovery
of which will somehow lead to a better way of life. To put it in
familiar terms, "modern science' does a -better job of keeping open the
channels of communication than do we in the legal arena.
" Such vital information as nature, size and operation of the life insurance institution,
for instance; the statuts of beneficiaries as a class in society, the alternatives to insur-
ance as a means of providing family security, etc.
19PAi'rBRoN, CAsEs A MATERIArLs oN INsuRANcE, (3d ed. 1955).
' The word "object" is itself the classifying label that finds a similarity in all
"things." Perform the experiment for yourself, using some other classifier. Thus
a watch and a person have in common "a face," "hands," etc.
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Take a well known example. There is available to a defendant who
has been sued for negligence a defense called contributory negligence.
If a plaintiff has negligently contributed to his own damage, the
defendant need not pay, even though the defendant, too, acted in an un-
acceptable fashion. That is one way of solving that kind of problem,
but it is not the only way. We know this because some states have
not this two-valued, all-or-nothing, way of looking at it. They have
settled on a many-valued approach. They call it comparative negli-
gence. Even though plaintiff too has engaged in "sub-standard" con-
duct, still defendant may foot part of the bill. It is true that in juris-
dictions not having the comparative negligence doctrine juries may
serve to soften the harshness of the two-valued contributory negligence
rule. Yet we cannot be sure. There is little flow of information under
such circumstances relevant to the on-going solution of this highly
repetitive problem. We cannot say that we are doing a good job in
this case; indeed we may well suspect that we are not.
Closely related as an all-or-nothing proposition is the idea of proxi-
mate cause. A defefendant is thought either to have caused all the dam-
age or none of it. Consider an Ohio malpractice case.21  It had been
established by the plaintiff that the defendant doctor had been negli-
gent in not detecting that plaintiff's broken hip had failed to respond
to his treatment. Because of the doctor's carelessness, plaintiff con-
tinued to suffer for three months in attempting to follow the doctor's
dictates to "go ahead and walk." After receiving care from another
doctor, she sued the defendant. While plaintiff's expert attested to
the manner in which defendant should have carried on, that same ex-
pert was not ready to say that plaintiff's hip would probably have
healed with proper treatment, as it had not under subsequent treatment.
Assuming that the requisite causal relation was missing between plain-
tiff's total condition and defendant's conduct, still, open-minded analysis
reveals that the doctor was responsible for a good deal of needless suf-
fering on plaintiff's part in that three month interim. Yet it had to be
all or nothing.
A sometimes amusing dichotomy, two-valued response situation, is
the substance-procedure one which finds its way into various problems,
receiving special emphasis in the "conflicts" pigeon-hole, as well as in
Federal decisions. Why not recognize, for instance, that the outcome
of a case may very much be affected by the manner in which a party is
allowed to introduce his story, his evidence - if he is allowed to intro-
duce it at all. To call a particular rule, say the one about who shall
plead and prove "payment" of a debt in a suit on that debt, merely
'Kuhn v. Banker, 133 Ohio St. 304, 13 N.E. 2d 242 (1938).
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procedural gives no good reason for so describing it if "procedural" in
this instance brings the response that a man will recover where he
would not have recovered had the rule been regarded as substantive.
Playing this kind of hopscotch - and courts purport to do so - often
puts a premium on ignorance, i.e., lack of information about the par-
ticular case and its relation to the social context. Or again, what differ-
ence does it make whether the doctrine of res ipsa loqzitur is substan-
tive or evidentiary? You let a man recover for damages by showing
simply that he was damaged by an exploding beverage bottle, and
you will have more people recovering for such things than if you re-
quire him to go into the details of bottle-making to ferret out possible
carelessness on the part of the bottle manufacturer. There is more than
method involved.
On the affirmative side, consider the trouble we would have if we
always took a one or two-valued approach to the idea of "property."
The commercial interests somehow seem to weigh heavily enough in
our system to overcome some of our language habits - they push in-
formation through and preserve it, for instance, in the form of split
"ownership." One person has tide for security, while another has some
kind of a beneficial interest in use and possession under a conditional
sales contract covering the vendor-vendee-chattel relationships. When
the many-valued approach is taken, some of us realize that if a vendee
breaches, he does not necessarily have to lose the chattel and all the
money he has paid. In this connection, consider' the equity of redemp-
tion in mortgage-law syntax, a concept helping to prevent one all-or-
nothing approach.
The two-valued sort of reaction occurs at various levels of abstrac-
tion. On a. higher verbal level than yet considered, think of the various
classifications we have for the area labelled "torts." We have assault,
battery, false imprisonment trespass to chattels and realty, nuisance,
negligence, defamation, right of privacy, misrepresentation, malicious
prosecution, etc. I have already indicated something of the limitations
on communication which occur when we emphasize these nominate
torts in the form of definitions. Now consider the difficulty we may
have in moving from one of these concepts to another. We have
trouble recognizing that this is not the only or perhaps even the best
way of organizing the lower level abstractions called opinions which
are thus moated off by this classification. The traditional classification
does involve certain significant relationships. Courts and juries do tend
to react differently depending upon whether a defendant has harmed
a plaintiff "intentionally" or "negligently." However, enough judicial
reports can be found (if your thinking is not clogged -by the intent-
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negligence dichotomy) indicating that judges are not reacting on the
basis of that dichotomy alone to make the curious observer look around
for something else equally "vital."22
You cannot understand the stuff called "torts" unless you appreciate
the various interrelationships involved. The traditional classification
consists of words representing certain relationships. Assuming that a
particular advocate or decision-maker does not confuse the word with
the relationship (objectify or over-define), still his nervous system may
not be adequately dealing with other observable relationships. Greater
insight, increased information comes from appreciating the potential of
cross-classifying. As you might group marbles according to color or ac-
cording to size or according to weight or so on, you can group tort cases
according to "names" or according to interests involved or so on. Thus
you will come to see that a court's definition of negligence may turn
more on the fact of conflict between a railroad and an individual than
on continuity of definition with some other decision involving a conflict
between two automobile drivers. Likewise, the categories of nuisance
and trespass to land merge together and overlap simply because they are
doctrines applied to landowner conflicts. Another way of looking at
this organizational problem is to say, for instance, that the response to
"negligence" doctrine in an automobile collision situation need not be the
same as the response to "negligence" doctrine where firearms are in-
volved. It is the total context which should arouse the particular re-
sponse. Investigation over a series of problems raises the distinct likeli-
hood that there are more convenient classifications than those based on
the defendant's supposed state of mind: intent-negligence. Such a
classification may be made according to the conflicting interests involved
or the over-all kind of situations involved. Further investigation, open-
ness to total fact configurations, may lead to even more significant
groupings.
Some one will surely be thinking: All this is well enough, but the
traditional classifications are being used in the arenas of legal discourse.
What good is the cross classification? A point well made but subject
to this rejoinder: awareness of the potentials of cross classification in
the "mind" of one advocate will aid him in his reaction to the traditional
language. The reactions, not just the words, are of main importance.
The advocate will find a way to pass on his sophistication. This kind
of sophistication will germinate in any but the most barren soil. The
flow of information will surely be facilitated.
3. Elementalism - Misplaced Concreteness. The failure to think
= An excellent collection of cases proving among others just this point in GREEN,
MALONE, PEDRICK AND RAHL, CASES ON TORTS (1957).
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contextually, hinted at in the previous section, is buried so deeply in our
language and response habits that it -becomes perhaps the most difficult
readjustment for a person to make. Yet without this adjustment a per-
son cannot change his response-habits to any great extent. Without this
kind of flexibility, unobserved relationships will continue to go unob-
served, available information will prove in effect unavailable, the poten-
tial creativity of legal professionals as a group will remain mostly po-
tential.
Man's conquest of his world and his universe has been slow and is
far from complete. Yet his technical advances seem in many ways to
have outstripped his living advances, his awareness of the human rela-
tionships. Courts and lawyers deal not only with the technical, ma-
terial relationships but also the human relationships. Here is one area
where adjustment of the kind possible, of the kind at least suggested by
general semantics, is vital.
One may turn to Gestalt psychology for the understanding which
is one heavy plank of general semantics and which provides the needed
clues to contextual awareness. 23 There we find proof aplenty that we
tend to grasp our environment by differentiating one part from another.
Attention to objects in that environment causes them to stand out
against the background of the environmental context. But it is the
observer who may determine what parts of that environment to give
this attending and to a great degree how he will group "parts" of that
environment into some sort of an understandable whole. One may con-
centrate on a light bulb if he wishes and reach some understanding of
it -by the effort, but increased understanding comes from viewing the
light bulb in its context of socket, room-position, wiring, etc. A light
bulb with no context is meaningless, it does not exist. It must have
external and internal pressures to give it form and function. Take away
its socket support and it becomes very often a conglomeration largely
of glass fragments - "it breaks." A light bulb in different contexts
"means" different things, that is, sends out potentially different sense sig-
nals, calls for different human responses.
The human may abstract, to a great extent, what he wishes from the
various possible configurations in his environment and attend to them
and represent them by labels in various groupings. He tends to per-
petuate the particular configurations of things and words which he has
labelled, and the resulting habitual now preconceived configurations he
super-imposes on his environment and sees largely what he expects to
see. Various experiments have been set up in psychology laboratories
'For an exciting experience and for a deeper understanding of gestalt psychology,
see PERas, HEFFEaLnE AND GOODmAN, GEsTALT THERAPY (1951).
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and classrooms to demonstrate the kind of response here involved. For
instance, a trapezoid revolving in complete circles may seem only to make
successive back and forth half turns because the eye of the observer is
fixed, by habit, on a particular portion of the trapezoid. He abstracts
an impression which he need not receive if he merely ignores his pre-
conception.
As with all our habits of observation which are re-enforced by
language symbols, our legal observations are similarly colored by the
observations we have previously made and the concepts we have pre-
viously formed. By way of simple example, suppose a person is driving
his car along a highway. He decides to make a left turn into a drive-
way. Immediately upon making his turn he is hit by an automobile
from behind which attempts to pass him in the left lane. The usual
recriminations result, but the driver of the passing automobile insists,
and his other witnesses support him, that our left-turner did not either
stick his hand out the window or set into operation his left turn signal.
How shall we characterize this situation? Shall we call this an "omis-
sion" to act? Then shall we go on to say that there is no duty to act
because there is no "special" relationship -between these two drivers?
One person is under no "duty to act" to aid another unless there is a
special relationship. Immediately you would object. This is not a case
of failing to act, it is a case of acting badly; this is "misfeasance." But
do you object because you think this driver is "wrong"? I challenge
you to present me one situation where a person's behavior has been
characterized as an "omission" to act where it could not be also charac-
terized as acting either rightly or wrongly. The dichotomy of action-
inaction has no fixed line because it is up to the observer to decide,
every time, where he will fix his attention, how large or how small a
context he will choose for observation. Having chosen the context, he
merely begs the question to tell us the nature of the context by calling it
"action" or "inaction." He tells us what he has done, not "why" he has
done it. He leaves out possibly a great deal of significant information.
We may guess but we cannot know. If we agree with the context
chosen, we do not fight the observation, or if we are preoccupied with
our "habits," we do not know enough to fight.
Perhaps a similar difficulty from another area of operation will drive
the problem home. I am told that good, intelligent doctors think of a
certain portion of the brain as the "center" of seeing. Since this portion
is the "center," it is the most important part of that process and deserves
the most attention. It stands out from its nervous system environment
because it is called the center. Vital relationships come to be ignored.
What happens if you cut out the eyes? Does the "center" go on seeing?
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There are cases of people who have not "seen" in the early part of
their lives because of a cataract condition, a clouding of the eye lens.
Removal of the condition does not allow the person to see, at least in
the way you and I see. Why not? Because the whole nervous system
is involved in the process of seeing. The world environment is a skit-
tery mass of confusion. The nervous system must be allowed to adjust
to the new impressions 'being received and to tie them in with the pat-
terns of relationships already built from the accumulations of other
kinds of sense impressions. This re-orientation takes more than the
"center" of seeing, or the eye. It takes the whole configuration called
man as well as his environment. 24
Consider the parallel for the doctrine of proximate causation. What
is a "cause" or not a "cause," let alone proximate, is not determined by
any particular physical law of nature but by the observer and where he
chooses to let his attention fall. I am presently sure of no fixed guide
to tell any observer where to let his attention fall, but I do feel that a
decision on the matter should not be made until the various relationships
are looked for. The advent and increase of liability insurance could
change the entire concept, the method of fixing 'blame." We can
think in different contexts, if we wish; and instead of individual fault,
we can think of social fault. The collision of two automobiles can be
considered in a context which includes every driver in the United States
who in some way contributes to the total traffic configuration. Where
is the "cause" of a collision? Pretty much where you choose to place it.
Closely allied is the notion of criminal fault. Sufficient studies have
been made to show that the "criminal" has a context. Who is to
'"bame," he or his social context? What primitive notion is it that
ignores the conditioning aspects of many a "criminal's" 'behavior. We
all contribute to this attitude in some way or another. The primitive
notion will long remain, probably for various reasons including selfish
interests, but also because of an inability to think contextually, an in-
ability to gather in available information which can -be regarded as rele-
vant to whatever observer who wishes to regard it as relevant.
Or what happens to "freedom of contract" when you raise your atten-
tion from the individual to that individual in a social context? Is it
realistic to ignore the pressures upon him, economic, psychological,
physiological, cultural, etc.? Somehow the idea breaks through here and
there, clears the communication obstacles, and we find courts looking,
perhaps not articulately, but looking at the relative positions and con-
texts of the parties. Take again your life insurance contract. To look
"I am indebted for this illustration to Russell Meyers, M.D., given at the seminar-
workshop on General Semantics, held at Bard College, August 16-26, 1957.
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at the preliminary negotiations of this kind of a transaction in the limited
light of "trading post" bargaining is uncalled for. You will accept the
point only if you do not bring your preconceived notions of "contract"
to -bear on this situation. Away with the status-individual dichotomy!
Tests have shown that the voluntary-involuntary dichotomy is no
longer informative, nor the intellect-emotion, conscious-unconscious
groupings.25 The world is not made up of two camps of "matter" and
"energy," rather of matter-energy. "Space" does not exist separately
from "time"; these are correlative measurements to help man work in
his environment; so it is space-time. Logic of the formal kind does not
fit into two neat categories of inductive and deductive. One process
necessarily involves the other.26
What is the meaning of the property and sovereignty dichotomy? Is
property something that an individual 'has by himself? If so, explain
the meaning of "property" absent governmental protection. And ex-
plain how the holder of 'property" exercises varying degrees of control
over his neighbor without being elected to office. If you would differ-
entiate "property" from "contract," explain a negotiable instrument to me.
Which is it? I have already suggested that "intent" cannot be moated
off from "negligence" and that one "tort" often occupies the skin of
another.
You will see the significance of these examples and you will find
many others for yourself once you realize the human potential of ob-
serving previously unobserved relationships. Here is the fountain of
creativity virtually exploding its spray in your face.
CONCLUSION
General semantic theory involves a great deal more than language
skill. Indeed general semantics treats mastery of language as a skill
requisite to deeper individual adjustment to environmental conditions.
General semantics in its deepest implications deals with personal therapy.
You see, then, that I have only touched on a part of the implications of
that discipline for the legal profession, and I have tried to treat that
part in a relatively elementary fashion - elementary so far as the depth
of general semantic theory is concerned.
It may be an unfortunate corollary that many people cannot fully
These illustrations also come from Dr. Meyers, note 24. Dr. Meyers now sees
great promise that a course on general semantics will be introduced into the curricu-
lum of the University of Iowa Medical School. To prove the need of such a course,
he has in his "possession" a fund of examples of blocks to communication, inter and
intra personal, extant in the medical profession.
' As familarity with the "process of abstraction" so well shows.
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grasp the significance of the language and communication problems here
discussed until they receive the kind of training which Korzybskl could
give or which is now being given by the General Semantics Institute.2
My point is that general semantics cannot -be put to work -by anyone
who only mouths the words. Optimally, it requires -for its understand-
ing and more important for its use a reorientation of the person. Cen-
turies of cultural accumulation stand as an obstacle to that reorientation.
It just does not come easily. I only hope that I may here have helped
suggest that such an orientation, however you may achieve it, could be
of value to you and ultimately to your community.
' For information about General Semantic literature and educational courses, con-
tact the General Semantics Institute at Lakeville, Connecticut.
